The theory of linear inequalities and linear programming was recently applied to study the stable marriage problem which until then has been studied by mostly combinatorial methods. Here we extend the approach to the general stable matching problem in which the structure of matchable pairs need not be bipartite. New issues arise in the analysis and we combine linear algebra and graph theory to explore them.
Introduction
The stable matching problem describes a situation where agents are to be matched while having preferences over potential mates. The data for the model consists of a set of agents, a set of pairs of agents that are matchable and a list of strict preference orders of the agents over their matchable mates. The goal is to find a stable matching, i.e., a matching such that no two agents prefer each other over their respective outcome in the matching, where singlehood is considered to be worse than being paired with a matchable mate. This model includes the original stable marriage problem and stable roommates problem introduced by Gale and Shapley [7] as special cases. In the stable roommates problem all possible pairs are admissible, whereas in the stable marriage problem the agents are labeled either as men or women and only man-woman pairs are allowable. It was observed by Gale and Shapley [7] that stable matching problems that arise from certain two-sided markets, e.g., matching students to colleges, can be modeled as stable marriage problems. Further, they described an algorithm that computes a stable matching for any given stable marriage problem. Roth [16] Despite their apparent simplicity, stable matching problems have a wealth of structural properties. For the past three decades the general approach for exploring these properties has relied mostly on combinatorial arguments. A new approach for studying the stable marriage problem was recently introduced by Vande Vate [21] , who characterized stable marriages via the extreme points of a certain polytope when the number of men and women coincide, singlehood is prohibited and preferences are complete. The result was modified and extended to cover the general case via a simplified proof in Rothblum [20] . Vande Vate's approach was inspired by earlier work of Irving et al. [l 11, who showed how to reduce the stable marriage problem to a minimum cut problem such that stable marriages correspond to the s-t minimum cuts. Roth et al. [ 1 S] used the theory of linear inequalities and of linear programming to obtain new results and to derive new proofs of known results for the stable marriage problem. It is our purpose here to combine this linear algebraic approach with some elements of graph theory to study the stable matching problem.
In Section 2 we define a polytope, for each particular stable matching problem, that we call the fractional stable matching polytope. We show that this polytope contains the incidence vectors of all stable matchings of the problem. Further, we prove that the extreme points of the fractional stable matching polytope are always half-integral and we specify other structural properties of this polytope. There is an interesting relation between the results we obtain for fractional stable matching polytopes and classic results concerning the polytopes associated with matching problems. In Sections 3 and 4 we apply linear programming theory to obtain new proofs of known results on stable matchings and to extend these results to all points of the fractional stable matching polytope. For example, we show that the median (properly defined) on each triplet of points in the polytope is also in the polytope. Finally, in Section 5 we obtain a characterization of the extreme points of the fractional stable matching polytope.
Preliminaries and background
In this section we review some known results on polytopes associated with matchings on graphs. We then formally define stable matching problems using graphtheoretic terminology.
We begin by summarizing some basic definitions of graph theory. A graph G is an ordered pair (V, E), where Vis a finite set called the set ofvertices and E is a subset of {{u, w}: u, w E V} called the set of edges. Let G = (V, E) be a graph. A graph G' = (V', E') is a subgraph of G, denoted by G' s G, if V' c V and E' G E. Vertices u and u are adjacent in G if (u, v} E E. For v E V, we denote by N(v) the set of neighbors of v, i.e. N(u) = {u: {v, U> E E}. We say that vertex v and edge e are incident if 21 E e.
Two distinct edges having nonempty intersection are called adjacent. Let E' E E. We denote by & the vertices that are contained in the edges of E'. Then, GE' 3 ( VE,, E') is called the subgraph ofG spanned by E'.
Let G=(V,E)
be agraphand let ul,v2,... , vk be distinct vertices in V such that E' = {{vi, v2}, {u2, v3}, . . . . {z+_i, ok}} G E. Then GE' is a path with end vertices v1 and vk. Further, if e = {vi, vk} E E, then GE'" lei is a cycle. Thus, a path (cycle) is determined by an ordered list of its vertices where any two consecutive vertices are adjacent in the path (cycle). A cycle is called odd or even according to the number of edges it contains. Of course, the number of edges of a cycle is equal to the number of its vertices. A graph is connected if for every pair of distinct vertices u and v there is a path with end vertices u and v. A connected component of a graph G is a maximal connected subgraph of G. A graph is bipartite if its vertex set V can be partitioned into two sets such that there are no edges whose two vertices are in the same set. It is well known that a graph is bipartite if and only if its does not contain an odd cycle.
A matching in a graph G = (V, E) is a set of edges p s E such that no two edges have a common vertex. A matching p defines a one-to-one mapping ,u(.) from the set V onto itself where p(v) = u if {u, u} E p an p(u) = v if no edge in p contains v. We call p(u) the outcome of u under the matching p. Given a matching p we say that a vertex v is single or unmatched in p if ,u(v) = v. Otherwise, we say that v is matched and ,u(v) is then called the mate of v in ~1. In this case, we say that u is matched to p(u) in p. Each matching can also be represented by an incidence vector x = (x,+,)(,,,) E E E (0, 1 jE, whose coordinates are indexed by the edges of the graph and x,,, = 1 if (u, v} E ,u, and x,,, = 0 otherwise. The matching polytope of a graph G, denoted M(G), is defined by M(G) = conv{x E RE: x is the incidence vector of a matching in G}, where "con? refers to the convex hull. The incidence vectors of the matchings in G are known to constitute the extreme points of M(G).
We define the support of a nonnegative vector x E RE as the set of edges E+(x) = {{u, v} E E: x,,, > 0). Also, for x E RE and 6 E R, we define the set of edges E6(x) = {{u, v} E E: x,,, = S}. Henceforth, we shall only consider vectors x in RE such that 0 < x d 1. We call such vectors half-integral if they belong to (0, l/2, 1)".
The following classic theorems deal with the description of matching polytopes using systems of linear inequalities. In the case of nonbipartite graphs constraints (1) and (2) are insufficient for describing the matching polytope and one has to introduce additional constraints. The constraints of (3) are called the "odd set" constraints. Their removal for a nonbipartite graph will result in a larger polytope than the one defined by (1) and (2) and this larger polytope will have some nonintegral extreme points. We remark that Theorem 2.2 gives an NP-description of the matching polytope (see [15] ), i.e., given a graph G, a vector a E RE and a scalar b E R we can determine in polynomial time whether the inequality ax b b belongs to the class of inequalities characterizing the matching polytope M(G) via Theorem 2.2.
The polytope defined by (1) and (2), for an arbitrary graph G, is called the fractional matching polytope of the graph G and is denoted FM(G). A vector x E FM(G) is called afractional matching. The following result characterizes the extreme points of FM(G). It is useful for our analysis of stable matching problems to view them from a graph theoretic perspective. Any stable matching problem can be represented by a pair (G; P), where G = (V, E) is a graph and P is a mapping on V such that, for each vertex v E V, P(v) is a strict linear order on N(u) u {u} which has v as the last element in the order. In this case we call G the acceptability graph, P the preference profile and P(v) the preference of vertex v. In particular, we refer to a stable matching problem (G; P) as a stable marriage problem when its acceptability graph is bipartite and a corresponding bipartition of V into two vertex sets, M for "men" and W for "women", is specified.
Let (G; P) be a stable matching problem. For v E V, we represent P(o) by listing the vertices in N(v) in decreasing preference order. It is not necessary to include v itself in the list since we know it is always last. We call this list v's preference list and we call the collection of the preference lists for all u E V the preference table of the problem (G; P).
We also denote P(u), the preference of 0, by <"; in particular, for u, win N(u) u {u}, we write u + w if P(u) orders w before U, i.e. if v prefers w to U. Note that, as <" ranks u last, we have that u >I? u for each u E N(u). We express by u 6, t that either u <" t or u = t. Finally, for a vertex u and a nonempty set of vertices S c N(u), let max, S and min, S denote, respectively, the most preferred and the least preferred element in S with respect to the preference +. Further, we define max, $!J = min,@ = {u}.
A pair {u, v} E E is a blocking pair for a matching p if 
Gale and Shapley [7] proved that a stable matching problem with a bipartite acceptability graph always has a stable matching. The following result by Abeledo and Isaak [2] shows that if the acceptability graph is not bipartite, then there is a preference profile for which no stable matchings exists. The proof is included here for the sake of completeness. Proof. The Gale-Shapley algorithm guarantees existence of a stable matching when the graph G is bipartite; see Gale and Shapley [7] . To prove necessity, assume G is nonbipartite.
Then G has an odd cycle, say ulvz, . . . , vzp+ 1. We will show there is a profile for which there is no stable matching in G. Consider the profile defined by the following rule: for a vertex v $ {ur , . . . , vzp+ 1}, let P(u) = any ordering of N(v) andfori=1,...,2p+l,let P(u~)= Ui+l,Ui-l, followed by any ordering of N(Ui)\{Ui-1, Vi+,}, where vO = vZp + 1 and vZpfZ = vr. Consider a matching p. Then there is at least one vertex among { ur , . . . ,v~~+~} which will not b e matched to another vertex on the cycle. Without loss of generality, we can assume that u2 is such a vertex. Then v2 prefers u1 to ~(0~) (whether or not v2 is matched under p). Also v2 is ur's first choice, implying that p(ur) cvl u2. Thus, the stability condition (4) for the pair {ur, v2} is not satisfied and the matching is not stable. 0 
Stable matchings and linear inequalities
Constraints (7) are called the stability constraints. The result of Gale and Shapley [7] , showing that every stable marriage problem has a stable matching, proves that when G is bipartite the polytope described by (5H7) is nonempty.
The first step in establishing Theorem 3 in Rothblum [20] , was the observation that a matching is stable if and only if its incidence vector is an integer solution of (5)-(7). We next extend this observation to the case where the acceptability graph is not necessarily bipartite.
Lemma 3.2. The incidence vectors of stable matchings are precisely the integer solutions of inequalities (5H7).
Proof. Obviously, an integer vector satisfies constraints (5) and (6) if and only if it is the incidence vector of a matching in the corresponding graph. We further observe that stability asserts that if {u, u} E E and the first two terms on the left-hand side of (7) vanish, i.e. u is not matched to a vertex it prefers to u and u is not matched to a vertex it prefers to v, then necessarily u and o are matched to each other, i.e. x,,, = 1. So stability is equivalent to (7). 0 Lemma 3.2 implies that all vectors in the stable matching polytope must satisfy inequalities (5H7). But in the nonbipartite case these inequalities, in general, do not describe the stable matching polytope. The following example proposed by Isaak [ 121 shows that the polytope defined by (5H7) can have fractional extreme points, and can therefore be larger than the stable matching polytope. Example 1. Let V = { 1, 2, 3,4}, G = Kq, i.e., G is the complete graph with four vertices, and let the profile P be defined by the following preference table, where to each vertex there corresponds a row that lists its neighbours in decreasing preference order:
Since the graph is complete and has an even number of nodes, it follows that in any stable matching p all vertices must be matched. Otherwise, if there is a vertex v so that p(v) = v, then there is at least one other vertex u with ,u(u) = u and the stability condition (4) for the pair {u, v} is not satisfied. The only three matchings under which all vertices are matched are: pi = {{1,4}, (2, 3}}, pL2 = ((1, 3}, {2,4}) and p3 = ({ 1,2}}, {3,4}}. It is easily verified that of these only ,ni is stable. We also observe that the system of inequalities (5)(7) for this example is c x,,,< 1 foreachvEV, U E N(a) We note that the points in the stable matching polytope must obviously satisfy Edmonds' odd set constraints.
But, the fractional extreme point z in Example 1 does not violate the odd set constraints.
Thus, adding the odd set constraints (3) to constraints (5)(7) will not necessarily give a description of the stable matching polytope.
The next example gives a stable matching problem that does not have a stable matching, though the corresponding polytope defined by constraints (3), (5H7) is nonempty.
Example 2. Consider the stable matching problem (G; P) where G has six vertices, I'= {1,...,6}, and P is given by the following preference table:
P(1) = 2, 3, 5,6, P(2) = 3,4, 6, 1, It can be verified that the vector x with coordinates x,,, = l/2, for (u, u} E {{1,2}, (2,3}, {3,4}, {4,5}, {5,6}, (6, 1) > and x,,, = 0 for all other arcs {u, ul satisfies constraints (3), (5H7); and by exhaustive search we can check that there is no stable matching for the problem.
The above two examples raise the question of whether it is possible, by introducing additional sets of linear inequalities, to give an NP-description of the stable matching polytope SM(G; P) for an arbitrary stable matching problem (G; P), (see the discussion following Theorem 2.2). Recently Feder [6] proved that the optimal stable matching problem, i.e., the problem of finding a stable matching that maximizes a linear function, is NP-hard. Feder's result makes the search for any NP-description of the stable matching polytope hopeless unless NP = co-NP. This statement follows from a theorem by Karp and Papadimitriou
[13] (see also [15, p. 3321). Let (G; P) be a given stable matching problem. We then call solutions of (5H7) fractional stable matchings. The set of all fractional stable matchings will be called the fractional stable matching polytope and will be denoted FSM(G; P). We next derive some properties of this polytope. Proof. We first observe that Lemma 3.2 shows that all incidence vectors of stable matchings of (G; P) are in FSM(G; P), immediately implying that SM(G; P)
G FSM(G; P).
To see that FSM(G; P) # 8, let G = (V, E). We will construct a bipartite graph d = (F, l?) and will define a stable matching problem (6; P^) on this graph. For each vertex u E V, create two vertices m,, w, in p and for each edge (u, u} E E create the edges {m,, w,} and ( m,, w,} in l?. The profile P^ is next defined by having w, <,,,, w, and m, q,,, m, whenever s cU t. As G is bipartite, the stable matching polytope SM(C?; p) is nonempty and is the solution set of constraints (5H7) applied to (6; P^). Let 2 E R' be a point in SM(C?; P). We obtain x E RE be defining, for each {u, u} E E, x", " = t(%nu,w" + %l", WJ We will show that x E FSM(G; P).
Let {u, u} E E. Using the definition of P^ and the fact that ,9 satisfies constraints (7) for (6; P^) for the pairs {m,, wVj and {m,, w,> in E^, we have that and Combining these two inequalities shows that
By the definition of x, the above is equivalent to
proving that x satisfies constraints (7) for (G; P). The corresponding conclusions for constraints (5) and (6) applied to (G; P) follow trivially. So, x belongs to FSM(G; P), establishing the nonemptiness of this polytope. To see that the extreme points of FSM(G; P) are half-integral, suppose that x is an extreme point of FSM(G; P). We obtain ;i-E E^ by defining, for each {u,
gm,,w,+i* F, aM,,,u+am",wU=.C xu,j+i~I.xi.u+xu.~~ l.
'I WY " I >,> u Y
Hence, 2 satisfies (7). Clearly z? also satisfies (5) and (6), hence A E SM(G; P^) and therefore 2 can be expressed as a convex combination of extreme points of SM(g; p).
Let jk, for k E K, be extreme points of SM((?;p) such that where c, E K Ak = 1 and, for each k E K, A, > 0. For k E K, we define yk E K, we define yk E RE by letting, for each {u, o} E E,
Then the earlier arguments show that yk E FSM(G; P) and, as 9" is integral by Theorem 3.1, it follows that yk E (0, l/2, l}". Further, for each (u, u} E E Thus,
Since the right-hand side of the above equation is a convex combination of the yk's, the extremality of x for FSM(G; P) implies that the yk's are identical and, therefore, x coincides with them. In particular, x E (0, l/2, 1}" as asserted. 0
The last conclusion of Theorem 3.3 will be refined in Theorem 6.12, where we characterize the extreme points of FSM(G; P).
Hartmann independently proved in [9] the nonemptiness of FSM(G; P) and the existence of half-integral solutions in FSM(G; P). We also note that the half-integrality of the extreme points of FSM(G; P) resembles Theorem 2.3 of Balinski. But, in contrast with Theorem 2.3, FSM(G; P) can have an extreme point x where the set of edges Ei12(x) contains even cycles, as is shown by the extreme point z of Example 1. Of course, not all half-integral points in FSM(G; P) are extreme points. In particular, if (G; P) has more than one stable matching then the midpoint between the incidence vectors of any two stable matchings is a half-integral stable matching which is not an extreme point of FSM(G; P). Of course, the half-integrality of the extreme points of FSM(G; P) implies that Phase I of the simplex method can be used to compute half-integral points of FSM(G; P). We next obtain a necessary condition for half-integral points to be in FSM(G; P). We will need an additional definition. Let C = vi, v2, . . . , ok be a cycle in G, we say that C has cyclic preferences in (G; Proof. The matching constraints (5) imply that a vertex is incident to at most two edges in Eljz(x). Also, if a vertex is incident to a edge in EI12(x) then it is not incident to an edge in E,(x). Hence, the edges in E1,2(~) can be partitioned into vertex disjoint paths and cycles.
Let {v i, v2} be an arbitrary edge in E1,2(~). The constraint (7) applied to {vi, v2}
implies that C; ,,, v2 x,l,i + Cj >,, L(1 x v2.j > l/2. By possibly interchanging the roles of ui and vz we conclude, without loss of generality, that Cj, v1 X",,j > l/2. It follows that there exists a vertex u3 E V such that {v2, u3} E Eiiz(xrand u3 >U2 ui. Next, as X ",,"Z = X "2.U3 = l/2 constraint (5) implies that x",,i = 0 for i # vl, 21~. In particular, as v3 '"2 vl~ Cj >-, w *w,j = 0. So the stability constraint (7) applied to {vZ, u3} implies that Cj >_"I x0,, j > l/2. Thus, there exists a vertex v4 E V such that (u3, v4} E Ei12(x) and v4 >V3 u2. Repeating this argument, inductively, we obtain a sequence of edges {Vi, Vi+l> E Ei12(x), for i 3 2, such that the set of vertices {k E I? x0& > 0}=
{vi-i,ui+i} and vi-1 <vi vi+i. Since the number of edges is finite, we conclude that a vertex must recur. Let v, = v, be the first recurring vertex where s < t. Then t -s 3 2. If s > 2, then {us-i,&+i} = {k E I': x,,k > 0) = {kE I': x,,k >o} = {+I, &+I}, implying that v,_ 1 is a recurring vertex, a contradiction which proves that s = 1. So the sequence forms a cycle which has cyclic preferences, whose edge are in E,,,(x) and contain the edge {v,, v2}. Hence, every edge in E,,,(x) belongs to such a cycle. Henceforth, let (G; P) be a given stable matching problem with acceptability graph G = (V, E). Consider the linear program:
(LP) maximize 1 X"," {u.ul 6 E subject to x E FSM(G; P).
The dual problem has variables (a, y) E R" x RE, and is given by There is an unusual property of the above pair of primal and dual linear programs: each fractional stable matching is an optimal solution of (LP) and is also included in an optimal solution of (DLP). where the last inequality holds since x satisfies (7). To see that solutions x and (CY, x) are optimal for (LP) and (DLP), respectively; observe that so x has the same objective in LP as (CC, x) has in DLP. Thus, the weak duality theorem of linear programming implies that x is optimal for (LP) and (CY, x) is optimal for (DLP). C Xj," = 1.
j E N(o)
As Lemma 4.1 shows that every x E FSM(G; P) is optimal for (LP), we conclude that each such x satisfies (9), i.e., v E V'. 0
As a consequence of Theorem 4.2, we obtain sufficient conditions for nonexistence of a stable matching. 
Proof. By Theorem 4.2, each x E FSM(G; P) has
c X,,, = l/2 C C Xj," = 1 V'1/2.
{UJ} E E 06 VI jcN(v)

If 1 V'( is odd, it is clear that no x E FSM(G; P) is integral. Cl
The following corollary specializes Theorem 4.2 to stable matchings, showing that the set of matched vertices for every stable matching is the same. The result was previously proved by Gusfield and Irving [S] . Their proof relied on Irving's combinatorial algorithm for solving the stable matching problem. Proof. By Lemma 4.1 (LX', x') is an optimal solution of (DLP), where CI' is defined from x' via (8). Recall that yU," = XL,, is the dual variable that corresponds to the primal constraint (7) for the pair {u, u}. Since xh,, is positive, by the Complementary slackness theorem, every optimal solution of (LP) satisfies (7) for the pair {u, U} as an equality. As Lemma 4.1 shows that every x E FSM(G;P) is optimal for (LP), we conclude that each such x satisfies Eq. (10) for the pair {a, u}. 0
Corollary 4.4. Let p be a stable matching. Then p(u) = v ifv E p and p(u) # v ifv E V'.
The following two corollaries specialize Theorem 4.5 to stable matchings. 
Corollary 4.7. Let p and p' be two stable matchings and dejine V(p) z {u E V p(v) >" p'(u)} and V(p') = { II E V: ,u'(u) >, p(v)}. Then p and ,u' map V(p) onto V(p') and V(p') onto V(p).
Proof. It follows from Corollary 4.4 that l+') and V(p) are contained in V'. Let x be the incidence vector of p and let x' be the incidence vector of p'. Suppose u = p(u) and U' = p'(u). Since x,., = 1 > 0, by Theorem 4.5 ibex:.. +jFux;.. + 4" = 1. 
Thus, u E V'(p) if and only if p(u) = u E V(,U'
). The other statement follows similarly. q
The median property
It was observed by John Conway (see [14, 8] ) that the set of stable matchings for a stable marriage problem forms a distributive lattice under a natural partial order. This lattice structure was extended to all points in the stable matching polytope of a stable marriage problem by Roth et al. [lS] . The lattice structure of the stable marriage problem does not carry over to the general stable matching problem, but, in this case, Gusfield and Irving [S] prove that there is a (weaker) semilattice structure. For this purpose, Gusfield and Irving [S] show that given a triplet of stable matchings a stable matching can be constructed via assigning each vertex its median choice over its outcomes in the three matchings. The outcome is then a matching which is called the median of the three original matchings. Here we show how this construction can be extended to the set of fractional stable matchings.
Let S be a set of three real numbers. Recall that the median of& denoted med S, is defined as the second largest (or smallest) number among the three elements of S. The following two simple lemmas will be useful for our development. Proof. We may assume that a, < bl < cl and, hence, med{ar, br,cl} = br. Then bI + b2 2 r and b, + a2 3 aI + a2 3 r implying that bl + min{a,,b,} 3 r. Since med {a2, b2, c2) 3 min {a2, b2}, we conclude that bl + med {a,, b2, CZ} b r. 0
The following lemma will allow us to extend the concept of median to triplets of fractional stable matchings. In order for this definition to apply we have to argue that the right-hand side of (15) is symmetric in u and u. Indeed, Lemma 5.3 shows that this is the case. A useful property of the median of triplets of fractional stable matchings is given in the next lemma. We now show that the median of three fractional stable matchings is also a fractional stable matching.
Lemma 5.3. Let x1, x2, x3 E FSM(G; P) be three fractional stable matchings and let {u, v} E E. Then
Theorem 5.5. Let x1, x2, x3 belong to FSM(G; P). Then med {xl, x2, x3} E FSM(G; P). Hence, med (x1, x2, x3) verifies the stability constraint (7) for (u, u} and the proof that med(x1,xz,x3} EFSM(G;P) is completed. tl
Proof
Extreme fractional stable matchings
We have seen in the earlier sections that the stable matching polytope SM(G;P) is contained in the fractional stable matching polytope FSM(G;P), and that the extreme points of the latter are always half-integral.
In the current section we refine these results. First we characterize the half-integral vectors in FSM(G;P) which are in SM(G;P), and second, we characterize the extreme points of FSM(G;P).
We continue to let (G;P) be a stable matching problem where G = (I',E). For x E FSM(G;P), we define the mappings 0, and a, from the set V into itself by gX(u) = min,{u EN(u): x,,, > 01, (TX(u) = max,{u EN(u): x,,, > 0}, where we remind the reader that according to the definition given in Section 2, min, 0 = max, $!I = v. We recall from Theorem 4.2 that Vis partitioned into V" and V', where, for 6 E (0, l}, I" = {U E K CjeN(",xj,v = 6 for all x EFSM(G; P)j.
We next show that 8, and 8, are the inverse of each other. The result extends parts of Lemmas 2 and 3 of [20] which concern the stable marriage problem. Of course, it immediately follows that
E+(x) ST(X). (21)
The next result shows that for each x E FSM(G; P), the vertices that are contained in the edges of T(x) are precisely those in V'.
Lemma 6.2. Let x EFSM(G; P). Then VTCxj = V'.
Proof. We observe that (21) implies I" c V'rCxJ. Next, suppose v E V". Then c uENCvJ x,,, = 0. It follows that for each u E N(v), the stability constraint (7) for the pair {u, U} implies xi ," V X,, i = 1, thus, v <U ax(u) and, by (20), {u, v} $ T(x). Hence, v4 VT(x). 0
Let T c E be a subset of the edges of G and let Gr = (I',, T) be the subgraph of G spanned by T. We observe that T specifies a stable matching problem (GT;PT), where PT denotes the restriction of P on GP For v E VT, we denote by NT(v) the set of neighbours of v in Gr, i.e. NT(v) = {U E V: {u, v} E T}. The definition of VT implies that NT(v) # 8 for all v E Vr+,. Also, as NT(v) 5 N(v), max, NT(v) and min, NT(v) are well defined. Finally, for x E RE we denote by xT the subvector of x consisting of the coordinates indexed by T, i.e., xT is the orthogonal projection of x on RT.
Let x E FSM(G; P). The stable matching problem determined by x is defined to be (GT(x);PT(x)), where T(x) is given by (20). In particular, Lemma 6.2 shows that G T(x) = tvT(x)r T(x)) = (V', T(x)
). The next result shows that for each vertex v E Vi, min, NT@](v) and max, NTCxJ (v) are equal to qX(v) and C?,(U), respectively. For x E FSM(G;P), the following lemma provides a representation of the fractional stable matching polytope of (GTcx); P,(,,).
Lemma 6.3. Let x E FSM(G;P) and let v E VT@.) = V'. Then
Lemma 6.7. Let x EFSM(G; P), let y E RE satisfy E+(y) c T(x). Then y EFSM(G; P) if and only ~~YTH E FSM(GW;
Pw,).
Proof. As E+(y) c T(x), y trivially satisfies (5) for v E I'\Vr,,, = p. Also, since E + (y) E T(x), we trivially have that yrcX) satisfies (5)-(7) with respect to (G,(,,; P,(,,) if and only if y satisfies, with respect to (G; P), (5) for all v E VTcXJ = V', (6) for all pairs {u, u} EE and (7) for all pairs {u, u} E T(x). So it remains to show that if By restricting the conclusion of Lemma 6.7 to integral vectors we obtain the next result, proved originally by Gusfield and Irving [S] in the context of stable tables.
Corollary 6.8. Let x E FSM(G; P). Then any stable matching of(GTCxj; PTtxJ) is a stable matching of (G; P). Proof. Let C be an odd cycle of GTcxJ and let K be the vertex set of C. Then vc z VT(x) = V". Now, for v E I$ the connected component of GTcx) containing v contains Vc; hence that component does not consist of a single edge and Corollary 6.4 implies x,,, # 1 for all u EN(V). Then x E (0, l/2, l}E implies x,,, E (0, l/2} for all urn.
As VEI", we conclude that Let k E K. We will show that if u and v are adjacent vertices on the cycle C, then In this case, since {u, u} E T(x), Lemma 6.3 implies that Q~(u) <,, v cU a,(u) and rrX(u) <,u <" a,(v). Hence, the stability constraint (7) applied to {u,u} shows that .i au establishing (23). We next argue that with equality holding if and only if y,k,,;(,, = l/2 for every u E Vc. This conclusion is trite if y&(,,, > l/2 for every u E Vc. So, assume that for some u E I'& yt,,,,, < l/2 and we will show that (24) holds at strict inequality. Now, enumerate the vertices in I$ so that u is the first vertex and each pair of consecutive vertices are adjacent in C. In particular, the last vertex, say v, is adjacent to u and (23) implies that yi,a,cv, > l/2. As IV,1 is odd the vertices of &\{v} can be partitioned into disjoint pairs of adjacent vertices. As (23) holds for each such pair, we conclude that (24) holds as strict inequality.
Finally, by multiplying (24) by & and summing over K, we see that
We conclude from the positivity of the &'s that (24) must hold as equality for all k. As we have seen, this conclusion means that yi,,;(,, = l/2 for all v E Vc and our proof is completed. 0
The next theorem characterizes the half-integral stable matchings in FSM(G; P) that belong to the stable matching polytope SM(G; P). Thus no vertex in M can belong to a blocking pair and, therefore, pM is a stable matching. Exchanging the roles of M and W, we also conclude that p w is a stable matching. Hence, by Corollary 6.8, .nM and yw are stable matchings for (G; P).
Let Y, z E SM(G; P) n (0, l}" denote the incidence vectors of pLM and pw, respectively. It suffices to prove, for each {u, U} E E, that XtlJl = 1/2(Y,," + ZU,").
We observe that if {u,u} E E\T(x) then x,,, = y,,, = z,,, = 0 and (25) We arrive to our characterization of the extreme points of FSM(G; P).
Theorem 6.12. Let (G; P) be a stable matching problem and let x E FSM(G; P). Then x is an extreme point of FSM(G; P) ifand only x is half-integral and each component of GTCx)
with edges in EIi2(x) contains an odd cycle.
Proof. By Corollary 6.9 we may assume, without loss of generality, that Gr+, is a connected graph. We first observe that if E,(x) # 0, the assumption that GTcxj is a connected graph and Corollary 6.4. imply that T(x) = E,(x) and that this set consists of a unique edge e. We conclude that FSM(G; P) consists of a single point and the two assertions of our theorem's statement are trivially satisfied by this point. Alternatively, assume that El(x) = 8. We first prove necessity. Let x be an extreme point of FSM(G; P). Then, by Theorem 3.3, x is half-integral and, since E,(x) = 8, it
follows that x E {0,1/2}e. Suppose GTcx) does not contain an odd cycle. Then GTcxj is bipartite and Theorem 6.11 implies that x has a representation x = 1/2(y + z), where Y, z E FSM(G; P) n (0, I}", contradicting the extremality of x.
To show sufficiency, let x be half-integral and let GTcx) contain an odd cycle C with vertex set Vc. Then E,(x) = 8 implies x E (0, 1/2}E and as V&) = V', we have for each u E vTcXJ that x,,~~(,) = x0,, cV) = l/2. To see that x is extreme for FSM(G; P), suppose yk EFSM(G;P) and A,+ 10: for k EK, al-e such that X = xkoKAkyk and I&& = 1. It follows that for k E K, E+(yk) E E+(x) = El12(x). As yk EFSM(G; P) we conclude that for each u E VT(xI = V' We call a vertex v E VTcxJ determined if ~k,,,~(~) = yi,bX(Vj = l/2 for all k E K, i.e., all yk's coincide with x on the edges incident to a. To establish the theorem we next show that all vertices are determined.
By Lemma 6.10, the set of determined vertices is nonempty as the vertices in Vc are determined.
We next show that if u is a determined vertex and {a, V} E T(x), v is also determined. We consider two cases. First assume that x,,, > 0. Then x,,, = l/2 and as u is determined yk,, = x,,, = l/2 for all k E K. Further, either u = ax(v) or u = (T,(v) and therefore we conclude from (26) that Y!J,~(~) = yk,,,;,,, = l/2 for all k E K. So, v is indeed determined.
We next consider the case where x,,, = 0. We then conclude from (20) that v >, q,(u) and u >" a,(v). As yk E FSM(G; P) for all k E K, the stability constraint (7) for yk and {u,v} implies that Since u is determined we have yi,zX;;cU, = l/2, hence (27) means that yk,,,(,, 3 l/2 for all k E K. We conclude that < 1 Akyk,,,x(o) = x",,x(v) = 1/2; keK hence the positivity of the 2,'s implies that ~k,,,-~(") = l/2 for all k E K. So, L' is indeed determined.
We concluded that the set of determined vertices is nonempty and connected. As G T(x) is connected it follows that every vertex in V& is determined, implying that x = yk for each k E K, and thereby establishing the extremality of x. 0 
